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Neuroscientific and psychological research on moral development has until now developed
independently, referring to distinct theoreticalmodels, contents, andmethods. In particular,
the influence of socio-economic and cultural factors on morality has been broadly
investigated by psychologists but as yet has not been investigated by neuroscientists. The
value of bridging these two areas both theoretically and methodologically has, however,
been suggested. This study aims at providing a first connection betweenneuroscientific and
psychological literature on morality by investigating whether socio-economic dimensions,
i.e., living socio-geographic/economic area, immigrant status and socio-economic status
(SES), affect moral reasoning as operationalized inmoral domain theory (a seminal approach
in psychological studies on morality) and in Greene et al. (2001) perspective (one of the
main approaches in neuroethics research). Participants were 81 primary school (M = 8.98
years; SD = 0.39), 72 middle school (M = 12.14 years; SD = 0.61), and 73 high school
(M = 15.10 years; SD = 0.38) students from rural and urban areas. Participants’ immigrant
status (native vs. immigrant) and family SES level were recorded. Moral reasoning was
assessed by means of a series of personal and impersonal dilemmas based on Greene
et al. (2001) neuroimaging experiment and a series of moral and socio-conventional rule
dilemmas based on the moral domain theory. Living socio-geographic/economic area,
immigrant status and SES mainly affected evaluations of moral and, to a higher extent,
socio-conventional dilemmas, but had no impact on judgment of personal and impersonal
dilemmas. Results are mainly discussed from the angle of possible theoretical links and
suggestions emerging for studies on moral reasoning in the frameworks of neuroscience
and psychology.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s research on neuroscience has devoted increas-
ing attention to brain processes involved in moral judgments
and behaviors by investigating the biological foundations of
moral reasoning. In such studies, moral dilemmas, visual sen-
tences, and pictures were used as prompts of moral reasoning
and emotions during the scanning of brain activity by functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and in experiments using
non-invasive brain stimulation techniques (e.g., Greene et al.,
2001; Koenigs et al., 2009). These methods allowed investiga-
tors to identify the brain structures—in particular, the prefrontal
and cingulated cortex—which play a role in moral thinking and
behavior [for a recent review, see Fumagalli and Priori (2012)].
Starting with the seminal approach devised by Greene et al.
(2001), a distinction between two possible brain systems sup-
porting morality has been recurrently proposed. In Greene et al.
(2001) experiment, one of the first attempts to identify the neural
counterparts of moral judgment that is often quoted in the litera-
ture about neuroethics, a series of paired personal and impersonal
moral dilemmas were used. The most famous situation described
in such dilemmas is the trolley problem, in which the distinc-
tion between impersonal and personal dilemmas emerges clearly.
The impersonal version of the trolley problem (switch dilemma)
describes a runaway trolley which is heading for five people who
will be killed if it proceeds on its present course. The only way
to save them is to hit a switch that will divert the trolley to an
alternative track so it will kill one person instead of five. Most
people agree that it is right to divert the trolley in order to save
five people at the expense of one. In the personal version (foot-
bridge dilemma) a trolley threatens to kill five people. You are
standing next to a large stranger on a footbridge that spans the
tracks, in between the oncoming trolley and the five people. The
only way to save the five people is to push this stranger off the
bridge onto the track below. He will die if you do this, but his
large body will stop the trolley from reaching the others. Most
people claim that in this situation engineering the death of that
man in order to save the five workers is immoral. In both sit-
uations the choice is between five people being killed or one
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person being killed. Why is the moral choice different in the two
scenarios? According to Greene et al. (2001, p. 2106) “the cru-
cial difference between the switch dilemma and the footbridge
dilemma lies in the latter’s tendency to engage people’s emotions
in a way that the former does not.” This conclusion was sup-
ported by recording participants’ brain activity scanned through
fMRI. The basic finding was a correlation between the personal
vs. impersonal features of the dilemmas and patterns of neural
activity in emotion-related brain areas: personal moral dilem-
mas tended to activate emotion-related cerebral areas to a higher
extent than impersonal dilemmas did; by contrast, the activation
of brain areas associated with cognitive functioning was higher in
impersonal than personal dilemmas.
Building on Greene et al. (2001) paper, the involvement of
emotion in moral judgments has been stressed by successive
investigations which identified specific neural correlates of reac-
tions and decisions concerning moral issues which are emo-
tionally charged (e.g., Moll et al., 2002; Harenski et al., 2008;
Fumagalli et al., 2010). This supported the notion that in moral
judgment and behavior two brain networks are involved, each
associated with a distinctive attitude or form of processing: cog-
nitive vs. emotional, reasoning-based vs. intuition-based, and
explicit vs. implicit (Haidt and Joseph, 2004; Huebner et al., 2008;
Moll and Schulkin, 2009; Bennis et al., 2010).
Identification of specific neuronal structures that contribute
to moral reasoning and behavior strengthened the hypothesis of
some innate neurobiological roots of morality (e.g., Haidt, 2001;
Hauser, 2006), that could even explain the possible universal
facets of moral reasoning. In this vein, in psychological research
on morality and its development one of the most prominent the-
ories is the moral domain theory (e.g., Turiel, 1983). According
to this approach, moral knowledge is built and organized in sep-
arate domains which are related to different kinds of rules: moral
rules, which are aimed at preserving the other’s physical, psycho-
logical and social well-being (e.g., the rule forbidding kicking or
hitting a classmate), and socio-conventional rules, which are set
by authorities to better coordinate social interpersonal relation-
ships in the social systems in which they are located (e.g., the
school rule on calling the teachers by their first name). In rea-
son of their own nature, moral norms are perceived by people
as worthy by themselves and universally valid, independently of
authorities’ dictates and capacity to punish transgressors. On the
other hand, by reason of their social purpose, socio-conventional
rules are usually conceived to be closely dependent on authorities’
capacity to guarantee respect of the norms and to be valid only
in societies and organizations where authorities establish rules.
As regards rule transgressions, people usually evaluate as serious
and do not accept the breaking of moral rules, because of their
harmful consequences for other(s), whereas, they judge breach
of socio-conventional rules, which has no consequences of harm
or unfairness, as less serious and acceptable under some condi-
tions, for instance when they happen outside the context in which
the rule has been formally stated (Turiel, 1983; Smetana, 1988;
Smetana and Braeges, 1990; Smetana et al., 1993).
The distinction between moral and socio-conventional trans-
gressions may be grounded on a different activation of emo-
tions, since in moral rule violations the person empathizes with
the victim, but empathy is not elicited by socio-conventional
transgressions (Churchland, 2011). In the perspective of domain
theory, the situations described in the personal and impersonal
dilemmas proposed by Greene et al. (2001) can be considered as
specific instances of transgressions of the moral rule which for-
bids killing or harming another person, even if her/his sacrifice
could be advantageous for others. Therefore, personal and imper-
sonal dilemmas assess the domain of moral rules by establishing a
distinction between moral rule transgressions which elicit strong
emotional-empathic reactions and moral rule violations which
are less emotionally-empathically connoted.
Several studies have also provided some evidence that chil-
dren make judgments and classify actions in terms of the moral
or Socio-conventional domains from a very young age (e.g.,
Smetana, 1984; Tisak and Turiel, 1988; Smetana and Braeges,
1990; Smetana et al., 1993; Zelazo et al., 1996; Caravita et al., 2009;
Gasser and Keller, 2009). For instance, from the age of 3 years
children are aware of the consequences of moral actions and
they evaluate situations such as stealing or hitting without provo-
cation as wrong because of their intrinsic unfairness (Helwig
et al., 2001); 4-year-old children are also able to distinguish
between basic moral and Socio-conventional events (Smetana,
1981; Smetana and Braeges, 1990).
The precocity of making distinctions in evaluating the seri-
ousness of rule transgressions of different domains is somehow
consistent with the hypothesis of certain innate foundations or
precursors of moral reasoning, such as an intuitive sense of
moral wrongness (Haidt, 2001). Nevertheless, some studies in the
framework of moral domain theory also support the notion that
the evaluations of rule transgressions, even moral-rule violations,
can be affected by differences in socio-economic conditions and
cultural background (Sachdeva et al., 2012).
As regards socio-economic factors, notwithstanding the con-
ception of morality as potentially grounded in biological struc-
tures and innate components, some neuroscientific studies have
also provided evidence that neuronal structures and networks can
be influenced by socio-economic dimensions. Variation in socio-
economic status (SES) levels have been found to be associated
with variation in brain serotonergic responsivity, and therefore,
may also be related to differences in the prevalence of diseases
and problematic behaviors, including aggression (Manuck et al.,
2005). Gianaros and Manuck (2010) reviewed several studies,
finding that indicators of socio-economic position (SEP) are con-
nected with the functionality of monoamine neurotransmitter
systems and to the activity and morphology of brain circuitries
that are also involved in risk of health conditions. In an fMRI
study (Lane et al., 2009), people reporting lower levels of subjec-
tive SEP displayed a reduced volume of gray matter in the rostral
area of the anterior cingulate cortex. This area is implicated in
the regulation of emotions and in organizing both physiologi-
cal and behavioral reactivity to psycho-social stressors. Poverty
status is also associated with individual neuro-cognitive perfor-
mance in language, executive functions and memory in children
and adolescents [e.g., Farah et al., 2004; Noble et al., 2005; for
a review, see Farah et al. (2007)], suggesting that lower SES lev-
els are connected with variation in the activity of some areas
of the prefrontal cortex. In a research project on reading abilities,
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Noble et al. (2006) found that SES systematically modulated the
associations between reading-related brain activities in the peri-
sylvian and left fusiform areas and the phonological language
skills of children with equivalent phonological skills. Altogether,
this literature supports the hypothesis that socio-economic con-
ditions may affect the function, and perhaps the development,
of at least some of the brain areas and structures associated with
emotion and cognition.
Moving from neuroscience to psychological researching on
moral development, socio-economic factors have been found to
affect moral values and moral processes of evaluating situations
and taking behavioral decisions [for a recent review, see Sachdeva
et al. (2012)]. For instance, the economic background of indi-
viduals helps to define the worth that is attributed to values or
rules. The process is particularly evident for rules conceivable as
socio-conventional. Haidt et al. (1993) carried out a study on the
perception of moral violations that included (1) transgressions of
rules preserving the other’s well-being (i.e., moral rules, accord-
ing to the moral domain framework) and (2) disrespect situations
that were not harmful to others but involved the infringement of
socio-conventional rules, such as using the national flag to clean
the toilet. People of low SES evaluated the latter kind of situa-
tions as morally wrong more than did high-SES people, who were
more likely to consider those behaviors as socially inappropriate
and not as moral violations. In accordance with these findings,
values and evaluations of what is moral seem to vary according
to the differences in the social position of individuals, even those
belonging to the same cultural context or country: for instance,
the Indian social system of castes that are characterized by differ-
ent standards in the conceptualization of what is morally right or
wrong [for a review, see Sachdeva et al. (2012)].
Besides socio-economic factors, even cultural aspects can
modulate moral reasoning. For instance, the identity of the per-
son who is damaged by a behavior and of the agent of that
behavior can define the moral acceptability of the action in some
cultures but not in others. In fact, in some populations of New
Guinea harming or killing a member of the same clan may be not
acceptable, but if the victim belongs to a rival clan it becomes a
moral obligation (Read, 1955). Among studies using the trolley
problem paradigm or similar scenarios, Uhlmann et al. (2009)
found that the evaluation of the sacrifice of the innocent victim
as acceptable varied according to the identity of the victim (e.g.,
Iraqis vs. American civilians). In the same vein, Sachdeva et al.
(2012) reported findings from a still unpublished study showing
that Indian university students accepted the harmful action in the
footbridge problemmore readily when the agent was described as
a member of the warrior caste than as a component of the priestly
or scholarly caste. In the light of their own research data, Sachdeva
et al. (2012) also suggested that, for components of cultures that
are group- or duty-based, the distinction between the personal
and impersonal versions of the trolley dilemma may be not as
salient as for people belonging to individual- or rights-based
cultural systems.
Cultural differences are mirrored in immigrant popula-
tions. Studies on morality and immigrant families have found
some evidence that in child-rearing practices immigrants give
emphasis to adopting the values of the host culture while
maintaining the values of their own cultural heritage (Liu, 2009).
Accordingly, immigrant parents modify children’s school-related
literacy activities to reflect their existing cultural beliefs and prac-
tices, including moral teaching (Perry et al., 2008). Therefore, in
building their social identity immigrants refer to models from the
host society but also attribute relevance to their cultural origins
for moral dimensions.
In a tighter perspective, even living in urban or rural areas,
that is, different socio-geographic/economic areas with related
differences in density of the population, in economic activities, in
socio-economic opportunities and infra-structures (e.g., OECD,
1994; EC, 2005; UNECE, FAO, OECD, and World Bank, 2005;
Marcellini et al., 2007), has been found to have some influence on
moral values and reasoning (e.g., Yagnik and Teraiya, 1999). For
instance, in a study on early adolescents, rural youngsters were
found to be higher in moral reasoning than peers from urban
areas (Sahoo, 1985). Another research project on 10–28-year-
olds, however, showed that people from villages tended to justify
their moral decisions mainly in the norm-following and utilitar-
ian modes, whereas, older urban youngsters showed a tendency
to use deontological and perfectionistic justifications (Nisan and
Kohlberg, 1982).
Given this background, investigating the impact of socio-
economic, cultural and rural vs. urban characteristics of the living
environment on morality appears to be a promising and impor-
tant topic for neuroscientific research on moral reasoning. To
our knowledge, however, no studies on neurobiology of morality
have also included the investigation of differences in living socio-
geographic/economic area, cultural, and economic conditions
until now. Furthermore, most neuroscientific studies on moral-
ity involved adult healthy subjects and patients, whereas, only a
very few studies have been realized on children and adolescents.
(e.g., Eslinger et al., 2009) and we could not find any study that
also considered possible differences between children/adolescents
and adults in the brain counterparts of moral reasoning. The
investigation of morality among children and adolescents repre-
sents, however, an important line of research in the psychology
area (Kohlberg, 1981; Killen and Smetana, 2006). This framework
highlights the necessity of examining features of moral reasoning
and emotions in childhood and adolescence, not assuming the
characteristics of morality in adulthood as a universal model of
how morality works in children and adolescents.
Recently, overcoming the gap between neuroscientific studies
and psychological studies on morality in childhood and ado-
lescence has been proposed as a relevant challenge for future
research (Killen and Smetana, 2008). Filling such a gap requires
consideration of the differences in both theoretical background
and content, as well as in methods. Consequently, we aimed
to make a preliminary contribution towards bridging the gap
between research on neurobiological foundations on morality
and psychological research on morality by investigating whether
and how certain socio-economic and cultural factors affect the
moral reasoning of children and adolescents, as conceptual-
ized and assessed in classical neuroscientific studies and in the
moral domain theory. Furthermore, we aimed to test new tasks
(Antonietti et al., 2012) which can be employed to assess moral
reasoning because of their particular characteristics, in both
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neuroscientific and psychological research, so helping to con-
struct a bridge between the two research fields.
In consideration of such purposes, we devised a research
project aimed at investigating the influence of socio-
geographic/economic area, cultural, and socio-economic
factors on children’s and adolescents’ moral reasoning by assum-
ing the theoretical background of the moral domain theory and
the personal vs. impersonal distinction proposed by Greene et al.
(2001) as conceptual frameworks.
First, we believe that personal and impersonal dilemmas used
in neuroscientific research represent two kinds of transgression
of moral rules: transgressions which imply direct contact with
the victim vs. transgressions which imply indirect contact with
the sacrificed person and that can be assumed to be less able to
activate emotions. We expected that the transgression of moral
rules would be judged as less acceptable than the infringement of
socio-conventional rules and that the harmful actions described
in personal dilemmas would be evaluated as more serious and less
acceptable than the actions described in impersonal dilemmas,
since personal dilemmas activate emotions to a higher degree than
do impersonal dilemmas.
Second, we aimed at investigating whether certain socio-
geographic/economic area related, cultural, and socio-economic
factors affect not only the evaluations of acceptability of trans-
gressions of socio-conventional vs. moral rules, but also the
judgments of acceptability of the harmful actions as described
in personal and impersonal dilemmas similar to those employed
by Greene et al. (2001); in the literature, such dilemmas have
never been considered in association with socio-economic and
cultural dimensions. As far as moral and socio-conventional
dilemmas are concerned, previous literature (see Sachdeva et al.,
2012) showed that socio-economic factors are influential on eval-
uations of acceptability of transgressions of both moral and
socio-conventional rules, but they are especially associated with
variation in the evaluation of socio-conventional normviolations.
Therefore, we expected that some differences would emerge in
the evaluations of acceptability or rule transgressions because
of differences in the socio-geographic/economic area in which
participants lived, their immigrant status and their SES, and we
conjectured that these dimensions were more influential for eval-
uations of socio-conventional rule infringements than for those
of moral rule transgressions. As far as personal and impersonal
dilemmas are concerned, because this is one of the first stud-
ies exploring how the evaluations of these kinds of situations
can be affected by living socio-geographic/economic area, cul-
tural, and socio-economic differences and the first one carried
out on children and adolescents and in the Italian context, we
were more speculative in terms of formulating our hypotheses.
We mainly conjectured that the investigated factors were likely to
be somehow influential on moral judgment, and in particular on
impersonal dilemmas, that are less emotionally activating.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Participants (Table 1) were 81 fourth-graders (M = 8.98 years;
SD = 0.39), 72 seventh-graders (M = 12.14 years; SD = 0.61),
and 73 tenth-graders (M = 15.10 years; SD = 0.38). In the
Italian school system grade 4 is one of the two last grades of pri-
mary school, grade 7 is in middle school, and grade 10 is in high
school. The three groups, equivalent for numbers of participants,
were chosen so as to represent three different school levels (pri-
mary, middle, and high) of the Italian system. The same interval
of 2 years separated the groups and the selected school grades
prevented us interviewing students who were attending the first
year of a school level (students attending the first year might not
yet be accustomed to the new school level they were attending)
but on the other hand we were prevented from recruiting stu-
dents who were attending the last grade of the school level in
which they were enrolled (students attending the last year are
usually involved in preparation for formal or informal exam-
inations which are often required in the last grade, and this,
besides making teachers less available to take part in the research
Table 1 | Sample characteristics as percentages.
Primary school (n = 81) Middle school (n = 72) High school (n = 73) Total (N = 226)
Mean age: 8.98 years Mean age: 12.14 years Mean age: 15.10 years
(SD 0.39) (SD 0.61) (SD 0.38)
GENDER
Boys 59.3 55.6 52.1 55.8
Girls 40.7 44.4 47.9 44.2
AREA
Urban 46.9 48.6 52.1 49.1
Rural 53.1 51.4 47.9 50.9
IMMIGRANT STATUS
Native 79.0 76.4 90.4 81.9
Immigrant 21.0 23.6 9.6 18.1
SES*
Middle-low 27.2 27.8 6.8 20.8
Middle 54.3 65.3 48.0 55.8
Middle-high 16.1 6.9 45.2 22.5
Note: *Two missing data in primary school.
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project, could interfere with the execution of the research tasks,
for instance allowing researchers to test students at less favorable
times in the school day).
Participants attended two primary schools, two middle
schools, and two high schools in northern Italy. For each of the
three school levels, one school was situated in the city of Milan
and the other one in a small village or town in the province of
Brescia. After Rome, Milan is the second largest city in Italy, with
more than 1,324,000 inhabitants and a further 3,000,000 people
who live in the metropolitan surrounds. The urban area of Milan
is mainly industrial and is the most important industrial center
in Italy. At the end of 2011, immigrants resident in the city of
Milan numbered more than 217,300, i.e., 16.4% of all residents in
Milan (Statistics of the City Hall of Milan, 2010). After Milan, in
Lombardy the second biggest city is Brescia with around 193,800
inhabitants. The province of Brescia is very large and includes
many small towns and villages, which are mainly characterized by
rural and farm activities. Schools that were recruited in the area
of Brescia were situated in a rural village (Borgo San Giacomo)
and in a small rural town (Manerbio) in the province. Inhabitants
of Borgo San Giacomo number about 5500, 17.6% of whom are
immigrants. People resident in Manerbio number about 13,270,
with around 1850 (14% of the population) immigrants living in
the town.
In the participant sample, immigrants numbered 18.1%: they
constituted 21% of the primary school pupils, 23.6% of the mid-
dle school students and 9.6% of the high school participants.
Among immigrant participants, Asian children totaled 55.8%:
23.3% of immigrant students came from Africa, 11.6 % from
other European countries, and 9.6% were from South America.
When we considered the urban area of Milan and the rural area
of Brescia separately, immigrant participants constituted 17.4%
of students from the Milan area and 18.4% of the subsample from
the Brescia area.
With regard to SES status (two missing data), 20.8% of partici-
pants’ families were of low-middle SES, 55.8% of middle SES, and
22.5% of middle-high SES.
PROCEDURE
Before we allocated dilemmas (see next section), personal and
impersonal dilemmas were mixed and then divided into two
sequences so that the personal and impersonal versions of the
same dilemma were not included in the same sequence. Even
the moral and socio-conventional dilemmas were mixed and
then organized in two sequences. In this way we obtained four
sequences of dilemmas: sequences A, B of moral and socio-
conventional dilemmas and sequences C, D of personal and
impersonal dilemmas. The four sequences were then alternated
and their order was reversed in order to obtain two adminis-
tration protocols, in which sequences were ordered as follows:
protocol 1 = sequences A, C, B, and D; protocol 2 = sequences
D, B, C, and A. This strategy allowed us to start protocol 1 with
one of the two sequences of moral and socio-conventional dilem-
mas, whereas, in protocol 2 the starting sequence was one of the
two personal and impersonal dilemma sequences. Furthermore,
the sequence of moral and socio-conventional dilemmas that was
first presented in protocol 1 was presented second in protocol 2;
the same happened for the two personal and impersonal dilemma
sequences.
Each protocol was administered to half of the classes on
each school level and area (i.e., urban vs. rural areas). Protocols
were group-administered in the participants’ classrooms dur-
ing the school day in a single session of around 90min per
classroom. A research assistant supervised the protocol adminis-
tration, explaining the goals of the study and how to fill in the
dilemma protocol; she answered any question that was raised
by participants. In primary school classes the research assis-
tant also read aloud each of the dilemmas to give children the
time to answer the dilemma question. A week after the protocol
administration a make-up session was carried out to administer
the protocol to students who were absent on the administra-
tion day. The study was authorized by the ethical committee of
the IRCCS (Scientific Institute for Research, Hospitalization, and
Health Care) “Eugenio Medea.” Head-teachers and principals of
schools and class committees of teachers allowed the participation
of schools and classes in the study. Parents (or legal guardians)
of children participating in the study were informed of the aims
and procedure of the research project by means of a letter that
was sent by schools and delivered in the classrooms by the teach-
ers. In the letter parents were also informed that participation in
the study was not mandatory and they were invited both to sign
the consent form that was attached to the letter and to give back
the signed form to the class teachers within 2 weeks if they con-
sented to their children’s participation in the study. In the letter
the possibility to contact the researcher (whose mail and phone
contact address were provided) in order to obtain more informa-
tion was mentioned. All children of the involved classes obtained
active consent for their participation in the study. At the begin-
ning of the session, however, participants were also informed that
their participation in the study was not obligatory, that it was not
a curricular activity but an activity for purposes of research only,
that they had the right to decide not to participate and that they
could withdraw from the study at any time without any conse-
quences. Then, before starting to fill in the measures they were
requested to give oral consent to participation in the study and
they were allowed to freely interrupt the administration at any
time. Only five students (2.16% of pupils in the classes) decided
not to participate in the study.
INSTRUMENTS
Personal vs. impersonal moral dilemmas
A series of eight pairs of dilemmas to be administered to pri-
mary school children and a corresponding series of dilemmas to
be administered to older students were used (Antonietti et al.,
2012). In both series the distinction between the personal and the
impersonal versions is based on a unique, unequivocal criterion
and possible confounding variables are discarded (Antonietti,
2011). Each dilemma has two parallel versions, so that a direct
match between the personal and impersonal scenarios of each
dilemma is possible, the contextual information being the same
for each dilemma, apart from the aspect which specifically distin-
guishes between personal and impersonal versions. All dilemmas
share the fact that the “helper,” in order to produce a benefit to
another child, has to operate so that harm, loss or disadvantage
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affects a third child/adolescent who is an innocent victim. In
impersonal dilemmas the relationship with such a “victim” is
indirect, namely, the helper does not interact face-to-face with
the victim; in personal dilemmas the helper-victim relationship
is direct, that is, the helper touches, looks at and/or speaks to
the victim.
The formal features of the dilemmas are as follows: short
text; easily understood; not involving knowledge of specific social
norms; not describing dramatic and emotionally impressive situ-
ations. Furthermore, all dilemmas share the following “narrative”
characteristics: They always and only involve children (as far as
the moral aspect is concerned); the victim is always unaware
(otherwise he/she might decide to sacrifice him/herself) and can-
not avoid being involved in the action carried out by the helper;
the helper cannot sacrifice her/himself instead of the victim; the
action performed by the helper always has a certain outcome;
the helper gains no direct advantage or suffers damage as a
consequence of her/his action.
In order to insure equivalence and exclude other possible con-
founding variables, the impersonal and personal versions of each
dilemma are similar with respect to the number of words, the
number of contrastives (such as “but,” “however,” and “con-
versely,” which might be influential since they stress the oppo-
sition between the two outcomes of the vignette), the degree of
difficulty of the wording and of the syntactic structure, the degree
of responsibility of the victim and of the beneficiary and the basic
script (the helper may damage the victim to produce a benefit to
the beneficiary).
The same basic structure of a pair of parallel dilemmas served
for the series for primary school students and the corresponding
series for older students (in the Italian school system middle and
high schools share the samemain characteristics). The differences
between the versions devised for the two age levels rely on the kind
of objects and situations mentioned in the dilemmas, in order to
match what usually occurs in, respectively, children and adoles-
cents’ school and everyday experiences. In both the series, in half
of the dilemmas characters are girls and in half boys. Examples of
pairs of dilemmas are as follows:
“Marco is hitting Giorgio very hard. You strike Marco with a foot-
ball to stop him. Marco starts to cry and Giorgio succeeds in
escaping.”
(Primary school—Personal version)
“Nicola is hitting Luca very hard. You see that a football about to
hit Nicola on the head and you don’t warn him. Nicola is struck by
the ball and starts to cry and Luca succeeds in escaping.”
(Primary school—Impersonal version)
“Anna spreads rumors about Elisa and writes nasty things about
Elisa in her own diary. You want Elisa to know what is happening.
In front of Elisa you force Anna to give you her diary and read
aloud what she has written about Elisa.”
(Middle and High school—Personal version)
“Luisa spreads rumors about Caterina and writes nasty things
about Caterina in her own diary. You want Caterina to know what
is happening. You make Caterina find Luisa’s diary and read what
Luisa has written about her.”
(Middle and High school—Impersonal version)
Each dilemma ends with the question: “Is it right to do
so?” The respondent has to check the box corresponding to the
response “It is right” (coded as 1) or “It is wrong” (coded as 0)
written below the text of the dilemma. Total scores of the sub-
series of personal and impersonal dilemmas were the sum of the
dilemma answers, with higher scores corresponding to admission
of the damage to the innocent victim. In all school-level groups,
reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of both the sub-series of personal
and impersonal dilemmas was low but still acceptable, given the
meaningful content of themeasure and the small number of items
(Schmitt, 1996). Reliability was better for middle school (per-
sonal dilemmas: α = 0.59; impersonal dilemmas: α = 0.64) and
high school students (personal dilemmas: α = 0.57; impersonal
dilemmas: α = 0.64) than for primary school children (personal
dilemmas: α = 0.55; impersonal dilemmas: α = 0.50).
Moral vs. socio-conventional dilemmas
A series of 20 moral and a series of 20 socio-conventional dilem-
mas were created (Antonietti et al., 2012) to assess the perception
of rules as breakable. Each item describes a situation in which a
child is breaking a school rule that has been explicitly stated. In
moral dilemmas the broken school rules are rules aimed at pre-
serving the other’s rights and psychological or physical well-being;
in socio-conventional dilemmas the broken rules are designed to
preserve the social order. Moral and socio-conventional dilem-
mas all involve only characters of the same age and of the same
school-level of respondent. In both series, the child reading the
situations assumes the perspective of the main character of the
stories. In half of the dilemmas other characters are girls and in
half boys. Dilemmas of the two series are equivalent in terms of
the word number and grammatical structure. Sample dilemmas
are as follows:
“In your school there is a rule that you must not take other chil-
dren’s things. One day at school you are in the cafeteria and you
force John to give you his lunch and you eat it in front of him.”
(Primary school—Moral dilemma)
“In your school there is a rule that children must stand up when
an adult enters the classroom. A morning a school janitress enters
into the classroom and you don’t stand up because you are aiming
to draw.”
(Primary school—Socio-conventional dilemma)
“In your school there is the rule forbidding damage to the belong-
ings of others. One day at school during the break time you rip up
the assignment of one of your classmates because she has obtained
a better mark than you.”
(Middle and High school—Moral dilemma)
“In your school there is a rule forbidding you to leave books out-
side personal lockers at the end of lessons. One morning, you are
in a hurry to get out of school and you leave your history book on
your desk.”
(Middle and High school—Socio-conventional dilemma)
For personal and impersonal dilemmas alike, each moral and
socio-conventional dilemma is followed by a question asking
whether the rule transgression is right (coded as 1) or wrong
(coded as 0).
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For both series of dilemmas the total score was obtained by
summing the dilemma scores. The reliability of both series was
acceptable among primary school children (moral dilemmas: α =
0.67; socio-conventional dilemmas: α = 0.83), good among both
middle school (moral dilemmas: α = 0.91; socio-conventional
dilemmas: α = 0.92), and high school students (moral dilemmas:
α = 0.91; socio-conventional dilemmas: α = 0.90).
Immigrant status and SES
At the beginning of the anonymous protocol including the
dilemma measures (see Procedure) participants were asked to
answer eight demographic questions in order to assess gender, age
in years, immigrant status (two questions), and family SES (four
open-ended questions).
The two questions assessing participants’ immigrant status
consisted of a closed-ended question that requested participants
to indicate whether they were Italian or foreign1, i.e., non-Italian
citizen, and an open-ended question asking for the name of their
birth country if they were not Italian (i.e., “If you are foreign,
please report your birth country”).
The four open-ended questions assessing families’ SES asked
participants to report the job and qualifications of their father and
mother. When one or both parents were dead or not living with
their children, participants were asked to answer with reference to
the adult care-givers who had legal responsibility for them. Based
on statistical information on the average incomes of jobs pro-
vided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics, information
on fathers’ jobs and mothers’ jobs was then classified in three cat-
egories of low-middle income, middle income, and middle-high
income. Again, the two variables of fathers’ and mothers’ income
levels were cross-referenced with each other and with the infor-
mation on parental qualifications, in order to classify participants’
families in SES categories. Although data on parental qualification
were also considered, the allocation of families to SES categories
was carried out by examining data on parental jobs. Data on
parental qualifications provided supplementary information use-
ful for better evaluation of the SES status of families but were
not essential for assessing families’ SES. We adopted this pro-
cedure because we were assessing the SES of participants, and
not the socio-cultural level of their families, and in the literature
(e.g., Pineo et al., 1977) SES is assessed with reference to par-
ents’ jobs. Following this procedure, we distinguished three SES
categories of participants’ families: families of low-middle SES
level, that is, in which one or both parents did not have a job
or had a job with low wages (and had only obtained a primary
or middle school, that is, the obligatory school level in the Italian
school system, qualification); families of middle SES level, based
on at least one of the parents having a middle income level (and
qualifications at least at high school level); families of middle-
high SES level, whereby one or both the parents had a job with
a high income (and in some cases an undergraduate degree; for
1In the Italian cultural and linguistic context it is considered discrimina-
tory to ask whether a person is an immigrant, whereas asking a person if
she/he is “foreign” is considered neutral. This cultural specificity explains why
in surveys realized in Italian contexts adults and children are usually asked
to report whether they are “foreign,” in comparison with “Italian,” and not
“immigrant.”
families in this category, however, parents had high qualifications
post-school).
RESULTS
STRATEGY OF ANALYSIS
Data were analyzed by Repeated Measures Analyses of Variance,
with Student-Newman-Keuls post-hoc test. ANOVAs were com-
puted by assuming the total scores in the series of, respectively,
personal vs. impersonal and moral vs. socio-conventional dilem-
mas as dependent variables and the Kind of dilemma as within-
subject factor, Gender as between-subject factor and, depending
on the case, Area or Immigrant status or SES as third (between-
subject) factor. The degrees of freedom vary in the analyses
because of some missing data.
EFFECTS OF KIND OF DILEMMA AND GENDER
As far as the personal vs. impersonal dilemmas were concerned,
in all ANOVAs (Tables 2–4) the effects of the Kind of dilemma
were statistically significant, with lower scores in personal than
impersonal dilemmas. Also, the effects of Gender were always
statistically significant: girls obtained lower scores than boys
(Tables 2–4).
With regard to moral vs. socio-conventional dilemmas, as
reported in Tables 2–4, the main effect of the Kind of dilemma
was significant in all the ANOVAs: scores were lower in moral
than socio-conventional dilemmas. When we performed sepa-
rate analyses in the three school-level groups 2, main effects of
Kind of dilemma were similar to the findings obtained in the
overall sample. As far as the personal vs. impersonal dilemmas
were concerned, in all ANOVAs (not reported here to save space)
the effects of the Kind of dilemma were statistically significant
(ps < 0.05): Scores were lower in personal than in impersonal
dilemmas. With regard to moral vs. socio-conventional dilem-
mas, the main effect of the Kind of dilemma was significant
in all three school levels analyzed separately (ps < 0.01), with
lower mean scores for the moral than for the socio-conventional
dilemmas.
The main effect of Gender wasmarginal in the ANOVA includ-
ing the Area as fixed factor, but significant in ANOVAs including
Immigrant status and SES: girls scored lower than boys.
EFFECTS OF URBAN vs. RURAL AREA
Personal vs. impersonal dilemmas
Area (Table 2) did not significantly influence responses and all
interaction effects were non-significant (Table 3).
Moral vs. socio-conventional dilemmas
Scores differed significantly across the areas, with the lowest mean
scores for youngsters living in the rural area in comparison with
peers living in the urban area (Table 2). The size of the effect for
Area was not very high, however. None of the interaction effects
was significant (Table 3).
2The ANOVAs which were performed separately for the three school-level
groups confirmed that the school-level did not moderate the associations
between the investigated variables, thus, these analyses were not further
considered.
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Table 2 | Mean scores (and standard deviations) of personal vs. impersonal and moral vs. socio-conventional dilemmas in ANOVA including
area as fixed factor.
Group Personal dilemmas Impersonal dilemmas Moral dilemmas Socio-conventional dilemmas
Urban area 1.88 (1.47) 2.56 (1.89) 2.23 (3.69) 4.92 (4.97)
Boys 2.24 (1.41) 2.85 (1.87) 2.88 (4.14) 5.46 (5.16)
Girls 1.33 (1.41) 2.12 (1.85) 1.28 (2.67) 4.15 (4.63)
Rural area 1.71 (1.54) 2.38 (1.61) 1.12 (2.52) 3.45 (4.62)
Boys 1.81 (1.53) 2.61 (1.63) 1.35 (2.35) 3.60 (4.72)
Girls 1.60 (1.55) 2.12 (1.55) 0.87 (2.69) 3.30 (4.56)
Total 1.79 (1.50) 2.47 (1.75) 1.68 (3.21) 4.20 (4.86)
Boys 2.03 (1.48) 2.74 (1.76) 2.18 (3.51) 4.61 (5.03)
Girls 1.48 (1.49) 2.12 (1.68) 1.06 (2.67) 3.70 (4.59)
Table 3 | Summary of ANOVA for personal vs. impersonal and moral vs. socio-conventional dilemmas, including area as fixed factor.
Personal vs. impersonal dilemmas Moral vs. socio-conventional dilemmas
df F η2 df F η2
Kind of dilemmas 1, 207 44.19*** 0.180 1, 221 123.54*** 0.360
Area 1, 207 0.26 <0.001 1, 221 5.50* 0.024
Gender 1, 207 8.67** 0.040 1, 221 3.47† 0.015
Kind of dilemmas × area 1, 207 0.03 <0.001 1, 221 0.71 0.003
Kind of dilemmas × gender 1, 207 0.08 <0.001 1, 221 0.29 0.001
Area × gender 1, 207 1.40 0.010 1, 221 1.16 0.005
Kind of dilemmas × area × gender 1, 207 1.26 0.010 1, 221 0.02 0.001
Note: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, †p < 0.10.
Table 4 | Mean scores (and standard deviations) of personal vs. impersonal dilemmas and moral vs. socio-conventional dilemmas in ANOVA
including immigrant status as fixed factor.
Group Personal dilemmas Impersonal dilemmas Moral dilemmas Socio-conventional dilemmas
Native 1.84 (1.53) 2.54 (1.73) 1.55 (3.01) 4.29 (4.97)
Boys 2.08 (1.53) 2.85 (1.72) 2.01 (3.28) 4.61 (5.15)
Girls 1.54 (1.49) 2.15 (1.67) 0.98 (2.55) 3.92 (4.73)
Immigrant 1.57 (1.37) 2.14 (1.84) 2.32 (3.98) 3.77 (4.29)
Boys 1.83 (1.27) 2.26 (1.89) 2.96 (4.40) 4.61 (4.54)
Girls 1.14 (1.46) 1.93 (1.82) 1.47 (3.26) 2.65 (3.77)
Total 1.79 (1.50) 2.47 (1.75) 1.68 (3.21) 4.20 (4.85)
Boys 2.03 (1.49) 2.74 (1.76) 2.18 (3.51) 4.61 (5.03)
Girls 1.48 (1.49) 2.12 (1.68) 1.06 (2.67) 3.70 (4.59)
EFFECTS OF IMMIGRANT STATUS
Personal vs. impersonal dilemmas
Being Italian or an immigrant (Table 4) failed to affect responses
significantly and the native vs. immigrant status did not interact
significantly with the other variables (Table 5).
Moral vs. socio-conventional dilemmas
The interaction effect of Kind of dilemma× Immigrant status was
significant (Table 5). Both Italians’ and immigrants’ scores were
lower in moral than in socio-conventional dilemmas, but immi-
grants obtained scores concerningmoral rules slightly higher than
Italians, whereas, Italian students scored higher than non-Italian
pupils in socio-conventional dilemmas (Table 4). Other main and
interaction effects were not significant (Table 5).
EFFECTS OF SES
Personal vs. impersonal dilemmas
With regard to personal and impersonal dilemmas (Table 6), nei-
ther main effects of SES nor interaction effects were significant
(Table 7).
Moral vs. socio-conventional dilemmas
When SES level was introduced into the model as fixed factor
(Table 6), the interaction effect of the Kind of dilemma by SES
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Table 5 | Summary of ANOVA for personal vs. impersonal and moral vs. socio-conventional dilemmas, including immigrant status as fixed
factor.
Personal vs. impersonal dilemmas Moral vs. socio-conventional dilemmas
df F η2 df F η2
Kind of dilemmas 1, 207 22.66*** 0.100 1, 221 50.22*** 0.185
Immigrant status 1, 207 1.92 0.010 1, 221 0.01 <0.001
Gender 1, 207 4.52* 0.020 1, 221 3.86* 0.020
Kind of dilemmas × immigrant status 1, 207 0.09 <0.001 1, 221 5.27* 0.023
Kind of dilemmas × gender 1, 207 0.13 0.001 1, 221 0.01 <0.001
Immigrant status × gender 1, 207 0.05 <0.001 1, 221 0.43 0.002
Kind of dilemmas × immigrant status × gender 1, 207 0.86 0.004 1, 221 0.45 0.002
Note: *p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001.
Table 6 | Mean scores (and standard deviations) of personal vs. impersonal dilemmas and moral vs. socio-conventional dilemmas in ANOVA
including SES as fixed factor.
Group Personal dilemmas Impersonal dilemmas Moral dilemmas Socio-conventional dilemmas
Medium-low 1.62 (1.55) 2.55 (1.74) 1.37 (2.57) 2.65 (3.20)
Boys 2.00 (1.71) 3.00 (1.78) 2.04 (3.29) 3.35 (3.75)
Girls 1.16 (1.21) 2.00 (1.56) 0.69 (1.29) 1.96 (2.42)
Medium 1.78 (1.49) 2.54 (1.79) 1.95 (3.72) 4.50 (5.21)
Boys 1.92 (1.42) 2.76 (1.79) 2.37 (3.91) 4.66 (5.18)
Girls 1.60 (1.56) 2.26 (1.77) 1.42 (3.43) 4.29 (5.30)
Medium-high 1.92 (1.49) 2.17 (1.65) 1.37 (2.25) 5.02 (4.95)
Boys 2.25 (1.38) 2.39 (1.69) 2.00 (2.72) 5.76 (5.49)
Girls 1.45 (1.54) 1.85 (1.60) 0.55 (0.96) 4.04 (4.06)
Total 1.78 (1.49) 2.45 (1.75) 1.70 (3.22) 4.24 (4.86)
Boys 2.02 (1.46) 2.72 (1.76) 2.22 (3.53) 4.67 (5.04)
Girls 1.48 (1.49) 2.12 (1.68) 1.06 (2.67) 3.70 (4.59)
Table 7 | Summary of ANOVA for personal vs. impersonal and moral vs. socio-conventional dilemmas, including SES as fixed factor.
Personal vs. impersonal dilemmas Moral vs. socio-conventional dilemmas
df F η2 Df F η2
Kind of dilemmas 1, 203 32.47*** 0.138 1, 217 102.51*** 0.321
SES 1, 203 0.21 0.002 1, 217 1.73 0.020
Gender 1, 203 9.00** 0.042 1, 217 4.71* 0.021
Kind of dilemmas × SES 1, 203 2.50† 0.024 1, 217 6.01** 0.052
Kind of dilemmas × gender 1, 203 0.01 <0.001 1, 217 0.03 0.001
SES × gender 1, 203 0.53 0.005 1, 217 0.34 0.003
Kind of dilemmas × SES × gender 1, 203 0.38 0.004 1, 217 0.34 0.003
Note: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, †p < 0.10.
was significant (Table 7). When we computed follow-up ANOVAs
separately for mean scores of moral and socio-conventional
dilemmas, pupils of different SES levels did not significantly differ
in scores of moral dilemmas, whereas, for the socio-conventional
dilemmas children from families with middle-low SES had signif-
icantly [F(2, 217) = 3.12, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.030] lower scores than
peers of middle and middle-high SES. Furthermore, participants
with middle-low SES were the ones with the smallest difference
between scores for the two types of dilemmas. The difference
between scores of moral and socio-conventional dilemmas was
significant (p < 0.001) in all three SES-level groups, with lower
scores for moral dilemmas than for socio-conventional dilemmas.
Other main and interaction effects were not significant (Table 7).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
First of all it is worth noting that the sets of moral dilemmas
we devised appeared to be valid overall since the patterns of
responses which we recorded were consistent with the underlying
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theoretical grounds and the literature. As far as personal vs.
impersonal dilemmas were concerned, the reluctance to evalu-
ate as acceptable helping an individual by damaging another one
was higher if there was a direct contact between the agent and
the victim, as compared with situations in which the agent and
the victim did not interact directly. As regards the moral type of
dilemma compared with the socio-conventional one, the trans-
gression of moral rules was evaluated as less acceptablemore often
than for socio-conventional rules.
Boys obtained higher scores in the dilemmas than girls, sug-
gesting that girls accepted breaking rules and harming a victim
to a lower degree than boys. Literature did not systematically sup-
port the notion that boys and girls differ in applyingmoral criteria
to situations or using moral reasoning [for a review, see Killen
and Smetana (2006)]. The trends we found in favor of a greater
acceptance of rule transgressions and harming actions by boys
than girls, however, agrees with the literature on gender differ-
ences related to social behaviors, showing that in childhood and
adolescence boys are usually more openly aggressive than girls
and more inclined to accept aggressive actions (e.g., Rose and
Rudolph, 2006) and to self-justify their own violations of moral
values (e.g., Hymel et al., 2010).
Moving to the main topic of the paper, in accordance
with our hypotheses socio-economic, cultural, and socio-
geographic/economic area factors affected the two sets of dilem-
mas differently. Specifically, all the investigated variables failed
overall to affect moral judgments in the personal vs. impersonal
dilemmas. Responses in moral and socio-conventional dilemmas,
however, were affected by these variables. In particular, children
and adolescents in rural areas perceived rules as less breakable
than urban peers did and the difference between youngsters liv-
ing in these two areas was higher for socio-conventional rules
than moral rules. Immigrant status significantly interacted with
the kind of dilemmas supporting the distinction between moral
and socio-conventional tasks: whereas, the native children con-
sidered moral rules less breakable than immigrants, the opposite
was true for the socio-conventional rules. Such a distinction was
stressed also by the effects of SES: whereas, such variables failed
to affect moral dilemmas, it appeared that the transgression of
socio-conventional rules was judged as acceptable more often by
students belonging to families with a middle-high SES status than
by students belonging to middle-low SES families.
Overall, the data clearly showed that the investigated socio-
economic and cultural differences affected moral evaluations of
the transgressions for moral and socio-conventional dilemmas.
EFFECTS OF SOCIO-GEOGRAPHIC/ECONOMIC AREA, CULTURAL,
AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS ON MORAL REASONING
When we considered our findings in detail, clear evidence
emerged that contextual factors can affect at least some kinds of
moral reasoning, thus stressing the need to include these dimen-
sions in the investigation of morality even in neuroscience. We
found that children and adolescents living in rural areas consid-
ered both moral and socio-conventional norms as breakable to
a lesser extent than peers living in an urban area. This finding
is in line with literature providing evidence that youngsters liv-
ing in rural areas tend to justify their moral decisions mainly in
the norm-following (Nisan and Kohlberg, 1982). This result may
express the higher level of social control characterizing small com-
munities like those in the rural area that we investigated. In small
towns and villages the compulsoriness of norms can be felt to a
higher degree because all the community members contribute to
guarantee the respect of the rules (Haidt et al., 2003).
A more complex pattern of results emerged with reference to
the immigrant status of participants, as native youngsters con-
sidered moral rules breakable to a lesser degree than immigrants,
but immigrants accepted the transgressions of socio-conventional
rules to a lesser degree than native peers. This finding extends
our knowledge of the psychological profiles of immigrant young
people (Arredondo-Dowd, 1981). A plausible explanation is that
people who have been living since the birth in a country real-
ize, thanks to the knowledge they have acquired of the local or
national “history” of some norms, that socio-conventional rules
are set and then modified or removed as a consequence of nego-
tiation, and thus they are more aware than immigrants, who
do not share the same kind of knowledge, of the non-absolute
nature of such rules. An alternative explanation makes reference
to the association between social experience and perceived con-
trol (Lachman and Weaver, 1998). Since, the environment where
immigrants live may be less familiar to them than to native peers,
they can perceive a reduced sense of control over such an envi-
ronment, and this might lead them to perceive it (including the
social norms which are part of it) as less modifiable (and thus the
social norms as less breakable). However, both explanations are
valid for immigrants that have not been living in the host country
since a very long time, and that cannot have acquired the same
experience of the local culture as the native people.
It worth noting, however, that in general immigrants differ-
entiated less between moral and socio-conventional norms. We
have to remember that in our analyses children from different
countries of origin and cultural backgrounds were included in
the immigrant group (the small numbers of participants belong-
ing to each separate country sub-group prevented us from testing
for possible differences among cultures). Thus, we cannot exclude
the possibility that the difference in evaluating norms we found
is owed not to cultural specificities but to an in-group/out-group
effect. That is, it is possible that immigrants feel to a greater extent
that all the rules of the host society in which they live need to
be respected to the same degree, independently of distinctions
between norms.
As far as SES is concerned, children of families of middle-low
SES judged socio-conventional rule transgressions as less accept-
able than peers whose families had middle and middle-high SES
statuses. This outcome is in accordance with findings reported
by Haidt et al. (1993) showing that low-SES people considered
disrespectful and disobedient actions that were not harmful to
others as moral violations. It seems that children and adults of
lower levels of SES are less able to perceive the conventionality
of rules regulating social behaviors which do not imply injury
or personal damage. This may express some differences in the
socio-cultural levels of families and of the contexts in which peo-
ple live and grow up, namely, differences which are tightly bound
up with variations in socio-economic conditions. Since, the envi-
ronment where low-SES children and adolescents live exposes
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them to less rich sets of experiences, and thus they have fewer
opportunities to differentiate among them (Evans, 2004), we have
reason to maintain that such reduced differentiation might also
apply to behavioral rules. A further explanation, which can be also
applied to the difference between native and immigrant persons,
refers to possible discrimination effects associated to the status:
Children and adolescents belonging to low SES families, as well
as immigrants, may be more rigid in conceiving rules because
they know or believe that the consequences from infringing them
might be heavier—for instance, in terms of social exclusion—for
them than the consequences for an individual of a high SES fam-
ily (or a native person) breaking the same rule (Phinney et al.,
1998; Liebkind and Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2000; Calavita, 2007; Brown,
2011).
NEUROSCIENTIFIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON MORAL
REASONING: BRIDGING THE THEORIES AND THE METHODS
This study is among the first to investigate sensitivity to the
distinction between personal vs. impersonal dilemmas among
children and adolescents. In accordance with findings provided in
the literature on adults, even children and adolescents (as overall
sample and separate school-level groups) evaluated actions which
harmed an innocent victim for a prosocial purpose as less accept-
able when the agent directly interacted with the harmed person
than when the contact between the agent and the victim was
indirect. This outcome supports the notion that children and ado-
lescents are sensitive, as well as adults, to personal and impersonal
distinction. Similarly, Pellizzoni et al. (2010) found that, when
administered the simple versions of the switch and the footbridge
dilemmas, even the majority of children aged 3–5 years judged
the sacrifice of an innocent victim as acceptable when there was
no physical contact with the victim and this action was intended
to produce the greatest good for the greatest number of people.
Along with this result for children of such a young age, our find-
ings on the evaluation of dilemmas by children from primary to
high school indicate that the distinction between personal and
impersonal persists across different ages.
Similarly to what happened with regard to the personal and
the impersonal dilemmas, the distinction between moral and
socio-conventional dilemmas was consistent in the overall sam-
ple and across the school-level groups: Transgressions of moral
rules were evaluated as less acceptable than violations of socio-
conventional rules whose purpose was not to preserve others but
to guarantee the order of social organization. The similarity of
findings on the distinction among personal and impersonal and
the distinction among moral and socio-conventional is consistent
with the hypothesis of an overlap between the organization of
morality as conceptualized in neuroethical studies such as that by
Greene et al. (2001) and as conceived in the moral domain the-
ory (Nichols, 2002, 2004). We can speculate that emotions can
provide the links between the two theoretical perspectives. Both
personal dilemmas and moral dilemmas are likely to activate to
a greater extent empathic feelings towards the person who suf-
fers as a result of the agent’s action. In situations such as those
described in impersonal dilemmas the physical distance between
the agent and the victim, which ensues from the indirect contact,
does not elicit emotions and empathic responses at the same rate
as situations of personal dilemmas. Even more than impersonal
dilemmas, the actions represented in socio-conventional dilem-
mas are likely not to generate empathic emotions, because they
are behaviors infringing rules which forbid violations of social
conventions without harmful consequences. Therefore, emotions
and empathy may underlie differences in moral reasoning and
the higher rate of empathy elicited by moral rule transgressions
and actions that directly hurt another person may explain the
reasons for which at any age (e.g., Smetana and Braeges, 1990;
Pellizzoni et al., 2010) these situations are judged to be more seri-
ous than socio-conventional rule violations and indirect harmful
behaviors, respectively.
The findings about the effects of socio-economic factors on
moral evaluations help to complete this picture. Differences in
socio-economic and cultural conditions have been found not to
affect evaluations of the seriousness of the actions described in
personal dilemmas as compared with impersonal dilemmas. On
the contrary, socio-economic factors mainly influenced the judg-
ments on infringements of socio-conventional rules, which were
considered as more acceptable than moral rule violations. In gen-
eral, breaking moral rules was scarcely accepted. This pattern of
findings supports our hypothesis that personal and impersonal
dilemmas may describe two categories of transgressions of the
samemoral normwhich does not allow someone to harm another
person. Variations in socio-economic and cultural factors are not
influential on differences in moral evaluations of these dilem-
mas since they express two instances of the same kind of moral
violation, which is generally little accepted.
Another novel finding of this study was that the expected
higher rates of transgression in the socio-conventional dilemmas
in comparison with moral ones emerged in children and ado-
lescents through scenarios that were shorter than those used in
traditional research and in which the situation was sketched in
a few sentences. These features of the dilemmas we used allow
investigators to apply them in research projects realized by means
of the fMRI technique, thus making possible studies of moral
reasoning as conceptualized by the moral domain theory in the
neuroscience framework. This is another possible link between
neuroscientific and psychological research onmorality. It is worth
noting that, even though the structure of Greene et al. (2001)
dilemmas and of the dilemmas we used was almost the same, the
tasks employed in the present study did not concern, as Greene
et al. (2001) dilemmas did, odd situations such as the trolley
problem but rather everyday situations. It has been argued that
the dilemmas often used in neuroethics investigation concern
unusual situations and this is seen as a limitation (Nichols and
Mallon, 2006; Klein, 2011). The dilemmas we employed did not
share such a limitation, and thus they might be considered for
future research.
Besides the links between the neuroethical and psychological
perspectives which can be identified at the methodological level,
other relationships can be found at the theoretical level. Both
perspectives are aimed at discovering the different “signatures”
supporting morality (Kelly et al., 2007). In addition, in both
paradigms the existence of dual systems has been maintained.
Finally, in both perspectives one of the two systems is perceived as
closely associated with emotion (Teper et al., 2011). Thus, a series
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of fundamental similarities (despite obvious differences) can help
to construct bridges between the two paradigms. Such bridges can
be established thanks to bi-directional relationships. On the one
hand, the psychological perspective can propose new conceptual
distinctions (such as the distinction between moral vs. socio-
conventional rules), show the role played by socio-economic and
socio-cultural factors in modulating the corresponding differ-
ences, and stress the need for neuroscientific research to detect
possible cerebral counterparts. On the other hand, neuroscientific
investigations can suggest and support conceptual distinctions
on the basis of the evidence of different underlying brain struc-
tures and processes. The common goal of discovering the natural
grounds of morality might be achieved better thanks to the
links between the two perspectives which can be highlighted by
applying the same research materials and theoretical frameworks.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
There are some limitations in this study. First, as mentioned
before, because of the size of the samples, we could not distinguish
in the group of immigrants between children and adolescents
from different countries and, consequently, from specific differ-
ent cultural backgrounds. In addition, the immigrant status as
assessed on the basis of the place of birth and on being or not
Italian is only an approximated measure of the actual differences
in cultures shared by the individuals. These limitations made
our interpretation of differences depending on immigrant status
speculative to some extent.
Moreover, as regards measures, we have to bear in mind that
reliability coefficients for the personal and impersonal dilem-
mas were low, particularly for the primary school subsample.
This feature of the measure may be owed to its short length,
but also to the complexity of the assessed construct, for which
Greene and colleagues did not provide reliability. Nevertheless,
the association we found needs to be cautiously interpreted,
because it may be underestimated (Schmitt, 1996). Finally, the
collective way in which dilemmas were administered, partici-
pants simply being asked to endorse either the “right” or “wrong”
response, prevented us from acquiring information about the
reasons underlying their responses.
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study was one of
the first to provide some bridges between studies on moral-
ity in the framework of neuroscience and in the framework
of psychological research. In particular, our findings on possi-
ble overlaps between the conceptualizations of moral reasoning
that were provided by the moral domain theory and the per-
sonal vs. impersonal distinction suggest the value of continu-
ing to explore this link between theories. Future studies might
investigate the neural counterpart of the distinction between
different moral domains, that is, the domains of moral and socio-
conventional rules. Future research might also better analyze
the possible involvement of emotions in differently evaluating
transgressions of moral and socio-conventional norms, even in
association with judging as acceptable the harmful action of an
innocent victim in the frame of personal or impersonal situa-
tions. Even more remarkably, in this study socio-economic and
cultural dimensions have been found to be influential on some
kinds of moral reasoning. It agrees with the literature, providing
evidence that moral knowledge and reasoning, as well as moral
behavior (Jimerson et al., 2010), differ as a function of varia-
tions in cultures and socio-economic dimensions (Sachdeva et al.,
2012). Until now, however, research concerning the neurobiolog-
ical basis of morality has not considered the possible impact of
cultural and economic variation on moral knowledge and behav-
iors. Nevertheless, a few studies [e.g., Farah et al., 2004; for a
review, see Farah et al. (2007)] have started to show that differ-
ences in the socio-economic conditions of life are also associated
with different activation of neural structures and even possible
morphological differences in some areas (Lane et al., 2009). Can
socio-economic and cultural factors also affect the neural coun-
terparts of morality? If the answer to the question is positive, do
these contextual factors affect differently the neuronal networks
involved in the emotional and cognitive facets of morality? These
are open issues for future investigation and suggest interesting
routes for future research projects trying to fill the gap between
distinct fields of study (Killen and Smetana, 2008).
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